Ageing and pensions in the Euro Area Survey and projection results by Rother, P.C. et al.
SP  DISCUSSION  PAPER  NO.0307
25986
Ageing  and Pensions in  the
Euro Area  Surv.ey and
Projection Results
s  P.  C.  Rother,  M.  Catenaro
and G.  Schwab
March  2003
Uq3rot  ton
LABOR MARKETS,  PENSIONS,  SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
















































































































dAgeing and Pensions in the Euro Area
Survey and Projection Results
P. C. Rother, M. Catenaro and G. Schwab
March 2003
'b?Ageing and Pensions in the Euro Area
Survey and Projection Results
P. C.  Rother, M.  Catenaro and G. Schwab*
March  2003
Abstract
Population  ageing  will impose  a  significant  burden  on European  fiscal balances,  in
particular  through  pay-as-you-go  pension  systems.  This  study  presents  an
independent  estimate of this  burden  for  the  euro  area  and quantifies  the impact  of
two reform  scenarios.  Based on widely used but optimistic assumptions,  the present
value of future pension  deficits through 2050 is estimated  at 51% of GDP, adding to
the current  average  explict  debt  stock of around  67%  of GDP.  In  this  calculation,
the  deficits  currently  incurred  by  many  pension  systems  as  revenues  fall  short  of
expenditures  are  not  included.  Viable  parametric  reforms  represent  no  durable
solution  to alleviate  the burden  sufficiently,  as they  can balance  pension  systems  at
best temporarily.  A comprehensive  reform, including reforms  of current systems and
a  move  towards  partial  funding, is  found  to ensure  permanent  financial  viability  of
the public pension system.
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21  Introduction
European populations  are growing older.  Thus will have macroeconomic  implications
as  the  number  of  non-working  consumers  rises  with  the  number  of pensioners
relative to  that of workers.  In addition,  population  ageing will  have  Immediate  fiscal
effects, most importantly through rising  claims on publhc  pension systems and higher
expenditure  for health and long-term  care.
This paper focuses on the effect of ageing on public pension  systems in the euro area.
This  effect  is  of particular  interest  because it represents  the most important  of the
immediate  fiscal  effects  of ageing.  The  projected  pension  liabilities  wllU  challenge
countries'  ability  to  preserve  fiscal  sustainability  and  comply  with  the  rules  of the
Stability and Growth Pact. They will thus become an important dnver of future fiscal
policy decisions.  More broadly,  given the  size of the pension  liabilities, govemments'
strategies  to  deal with  the pension  burden will  have  a  sizeable impact  on  economic
expectations  and  the  macroeconomic  equilibrium.  With  the  objective  of adding
insight  to  the policy  discussions,  this  paper  provides  an  analytical  framework  and
some  quantitative  benchmarks.  In  particular,  it  presents  estimates  of  upcoming
pension liabilitles and analyses  the impact of alternative pension reforms.
Past developments  provide  some insight  regarding  the factors  dnving the behaviour
of public  pension  finances  (see  also  McMorrow  and  Roeger  (2002)).  In  the  EU,
public pay-as-you-go  pension  systems  represent the  most important  income  source
for the elderly,  covering  some  90%  of retirement  income  provision.  Between  1960
and 2000, total public pension expenditure  rose by more  than 6 percentage  points  to
some 12% of GDP.1 At the same time social security contributions rose  from around
11% of wages  m the  1960s  to around  19%  in the  1990s. These  developments  were
driven  to a large  extent by demographic  variations,  labour market  developments  and
changes in pension system generosity.
Regarding demographic  variations, a decline in fertility rates and rising longevity have
resulted in a gradual  ageing  of the overall  population.  Fertility rates were  high  after
the  war,  but  experienced  a  sharp  decline  starting  at  the  end  of  the  1960s  and
continuing  in the  1970s  and  1980s. Since  then,  average  fertility  rates have  remained
broadly  constant  at levels  below  2  children  per woman,  i.e.,  less  than  necessary  to
maintain  a stable population  size. At the same  time, life expectancy  at birth has risen
continuously,  from  less  than  70  years  in  1960  to  around  78  years  in  2000.  The
combined  effect  of these  two  trends  has  been  a  slowdown  in  overall  population
growth  and a  marked  shift in  the population  structure.  In particular,  the  traditional
population  pyramid  with  large  sizes  of young  cohorts  and  decreasing  older  cohort
sizes  has  gradually  moved  towards  a  more  rectangular  pattern.  The  number  of
persons  aged  65  years  and above  relative  to  the total population  rose steadily  from
11% in 1960 to 16% in 2000.
The demographic  developments  provide  only part of the explanation  of the increase
in  overall  pension  expenditure  pressures.  As  the  largest  share  of public  pension
expenditures is financed  through social security contributions  paid on labour income,
the  development  of the  labour  market  variables  has  an  important  impact  on  the
X  Note  that the histoncal  numbers presented  here serve  only  as indications  and have different  regional
and  functional  coverage  than  those  used  for the  projections  in  thus  note  National  developments
have deviated  signficantly  from the average m some cases
3stabilty  of  the  pension  system.  Labour  force  participation  has  remained  roughly
constant in the EU over  the past decades  at around  67%  to 68%, while employment
grew at an  annual  rate  of less  than  1/2%.  However,  these aggregate  numbers  hide a
clevelopment  that has become  particularly costly to national  pension systems.  This is
the  sharp  decline  in  old  age  labour  force  participation  due  also  the  rise  in  early
retirement.  Between  1960 and 2000, the  effective  retirement age in  the EU declined
by more than  5 years  to below 60. The rise in early retirement  has two effects for the
pension  system:  It lowers  the  number  of contributors  and  simultaneously  raises  the
number of pensioners, resulting in a double burden.
Finally,  the  overall  evolution  of  the  pension  system  is  driven  by  its  generosity.
Increases  in  pension  system  coverage  and  more  generous  benefit  formulas  have
resulted  in  a  steady  increase  in  replacement  rates, i.e.,  the ratio  between  individual
pension  and  labour  income,  over  the  past  decades.  As  a  consequence,  also  the
imnportance  of pension  income  from  public  sources  has  risen  relative  to  private
sources.
To forecast  the  future  financial  development  of public pension  systems,  this paper
combines  projections  for demographics,  labour markets  and  pension  policies  with
additional  assumptions  regarding  macroeconomic  and  policy  parameters.  The
approach  is a partial equilibrium  analysis which  takes macroeconomic  variables,  such
as  interest  rates,  labour  market  outcomes  and  productivity  growth,  as  given.  In
particular,  two  baseline  scenarios  assuming  unchanged  pension  policies  and  two
reform  scenarios  are  analysed.  Of the  baseline  scenarios,  one  uses  the  optimistic
employment  and interest  rate  assumptions employed  by other  studies  on this issue.
These  foresee  a  rapid  rise  in  labour  force  participation  rates,  a  drop  in  structural
unemployment  and a real interest rate of 4%.  The other baseline scenario uses more
realistic values, namely constant cohort specific participation  and unemployment rates
and a real interest of 3%.  For thls scenario,  the labour market  and real mterest rate
assumptions  have  not been  derived  from  a  common  macroeconomic  framework.
Rather, they have been combined with the objective of providing  a realistic  estimate
of future pension liabilities.  The reform  scenanos  capture  the  effects of partial  and
comprehensive pension reforms, respectively.  In particular, the partial reform remains
limrited  to changes  in the parameters  of the public pay-as-you-go system, such  as the
retirement  age.  By  contrast,  the  comprehensive  reform  assumes  a  move  towards
partial  funding  of  the  pension  system.  All  projections  are  based  on  Eurostat
demographic forecasts and assume labour productvity growth of 13/4%  per year.
The above assumptions  are inserted into country  specific models of national pension
systems, which  generate  projections  of their  financial  balances  over  the projection
period.  To  allow  comparability,  this  study  focuses  on  the  present  value  of these
financial  balances,  using  the  above  growth  and  interest  rate  assumptions  for
discounting  and  aggregating  across  countries.  The  major  findings  are  the  following
(see also table 1):
*  Based  on  widely  used but  optimnistic  assumptons,  the present  value  of future
pension  deficits through 2050 is estimated  at 51%  of GDP, implying the need for
substantial  fiscal  adjustment  (first  column  in  table  1,  covering  9  euro  area
countries,  e-9). This does not indude obligations  from health and long-term  care.
The present value of deficits  adds to the current level of explcit government debt
of more than 67% of GDP in the nine countries.
*  However,  the  assumptions  include  very  favourable  labour market  expectations.
The realistic baseline  scenario with constant employment and a lower real interest
rate of 3%  results in a present value  of future deficits  of close  to 90%  of GDP,
4with  the  labour  market  and  the  interest  rate  assumption  contributing  roughly
equal parts to the increase  (second  and third column,  covering the largest  4 euro
area countries,  e-4).
*  The  partial  reform  scenario  relying  only  on  parametrc  changes  represents  no
viable solution,  as  they can  balance  pension  systems  only  temporarly and under
optimistic  assumptions.  Higher effective  retirement  ages,  lower  average  benefits
and  increased  contribution  rates  could  reduce  the  present  value  of pension
deficits  to zero through 2050.  But such reforms would  leave large  financing gaps
thereafter.  In  addhtion,  it is  unrealistic  to  assume  that  the necessary  favourable
labour market  expectatnons  will  materialise  with further  nsing contnbution  rates
(fourth column).
*  The  comprehensive  reform  scenario  can  achieve  long-term  sustainabibty  and  a
sizeable  reduction  in  contributions  to  the  pay-as-you-go  system  through  a shift
toward partial  funding  (last column).  The  transition to financial sustainability,  i.e.,
balancing  the present value of the pension  system deficits beyond the  end of the
projection  period,  is  not  without costs.  Some participants  will  have  to  bear  an
additional  burden. In our scenario, replacement  rates for new retirees  fall by up to
23%  relative  to  the  unsustainable  partial  reform,  but  are  higher  after  2040.
However,  other  political  solutions  regarding  the  distribution  of this  burden are
possible.
Table 1: Main results (1)
Baseline  Baseline  Realistic  Partial  Comprehens
scenano  scenano  baseline  reform (e-4)  reform,  md
(e-9), AWG  (e-4)  scenano (e-4)  funding  (e-4)
Public pension expenditurc  in  2050  12  1  12.7  13 5  11 2  7 3
Change from 2000 (percent points)  4 2  4.6  5 3  3 1  -0 8
Present value of pension deficits  -50 6  -47.2  -87 3  unviable  -0 7
Annurty  1 7  1  6  2 5  0 0
1)  In  percent of GDP.
Three  studies  recently  published  by  the  Economic  Policy  Committee  (EPC),  the
OECD  and  the  European  Commission2 provide  usefiul  benchmarks  regarding
methodology  and  overall  results.  First  and  foremost,  the  report  by  the  EPC's
Working Group  on Ageing  (AWG)  has been  used  as  a  benchmark  for  the baseline
scenario  simulations  in  this  study.  The  report  provides  projections  by  national
institutions  on expenditures  for pensions  as well  as health and  long term care.  The
projections  are based on a set of common projections  regarding macroeconomic  and
demographic  variables.  Using  an analogous  data  set  for  its member  countries,  the
OECD  study  derives  comparable  results,  despite  some  definitional  differences.  The
European  Commission  has  presented  pension  expenditure  projections  based  on  a
macroeconomic  equilibrium model for the EU area. The model is calibrated  to reflect
the most important  macroeconomic  relationships  and is  then  employed  to generate
pension  expenditure  projections  and  estLmates  of  the  impact  of vanous  reform
scenarios.
2  Economic  Polcy  Commttee  (2001),  Dang  et al.  (2001)  and  European  Commission  (2001).  The
results  in  the last study  are ssimiar  to  the more  extensive  contribution  by  McMorrow  and Roeger
(2002).
5The results  regarding pension  expenditure  projections  are  quite  similar  for all  these
studces.  For the aggregate  of nine countries  analysed  in the present  study, the EPC
study  finds  an  increase  in  pension  expenditure  of 3.9  percentage  points of GDP
be ween  2000 and  2050, close to the OECD's result of 3.8 percentage  points and to
thlis  study's 4.2 percentage  pomts. The European  Commission,  by contrast, projects a
mtuch  higher increase of 7.1  percentage points. This is basically due to the underlying
assumption  that  both  labour  market  participation  and  pension  system  generosity
rernain  unchanged.  For  a  similar  set  of assumptions  regarding  the  labour  market
varilables,  the  Commission  also  reports  results  close  to  those  of the  EPC  and  this
study.
In  extending  the  approach  of  the  above  studies,  this  paper  provides  a  more
comprehensive  assessment  of pension  system  viability by  explicitly  taking pension
system  revenues  into  account.  This  allows  to  derive  the present  value  of pension
system deficits  as a measure of future burdens that need to be financed through some
kind of reformn. In addition,  only the explicit modelling of the revenue side provides a
full picture  of the impact of various  scenarios,  such  as the discussed  changes  in the
effective retirement age.
Th,e  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  the  aggregate  demographic
developments  and  the main  analytical  considerations  regarding  the pension  system
impact  of  ageing.  Section  3  comprises  a  description  of European  institutional
arrangements  for monitoring long-term  fiscal sustainablhty in view of ageing.  Section
4 presents  estimates of the impact of ageing  on euro area  pension  systems  through
2050, aggregating individual country estimates.  Section 5 sumnmarises and concludes.
2  Demographics and pensions
Demographic developments
The  scale  of population  ageing  in  Europe  is  reflected  in  the  rise  of the  old  age
dependency  ratio,  i.e.,  the  share  of  the  population  65  years  and  older  to  the
population  aged  15  to 64.  For the countries  in  this  study,  this  dependency  ratio  is
projected to more  than double  from 24%  in 2000 to  50% in 2050  (see chart 1,  right
scale).  The  average  increase  of  around  100%  over  the  projection  period  is  also
broadly representative  for most countries,  with Belgium and France showing a more
modest increase  around 75%  as opposed to the opposite extremes  of Spain and Italy
with increases of more than 130%.
Two  major forces  drive the ageing of the populations: increasing  life expectancy  and
low  fertility  rates.  The  rise  in  life  expectancy  experienced  over  the past  decades  is
projected to  continue.  For the euro  area, the average  life  expectancy of women  and
men is projected  to increase  by 4 and 5 years to 86 and 80 years, respectively.  At the
same  time,  fertility  rates  have  declined  sharply  and  are  now well  below  the  rate
necessary  to  naintain  a  constant  population.  Even  though  the average  number  of
children  per woman  is  projected  to increase  for  most  countries  over  the  forecast
horizon,  this  increase  will  not  be  sufficient  to  reverse  the  trend  of a  shrinking
population  in the countries  in this study after a peak around 2020 (chart  1, left  scale,
in millions).
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The demographic  structure  of economies is also affected by the pattern of migration
which  is  difficult  to  predict.  Total  annual  net  irniigration  is  forecast  at  around
500,000  persons  for  the  countries  in  this  study,  equivalent  to 0.18%  of the  total
population. The total  number of people  who are projected  to immigrate to the euro
area  over  the  projection  period  would,  thus,  amount  to  around  9%  of the  total
population  in  the  base  year.  While  total  immigration  flows  may  respond  to
differentials  in per capita wealth  between  the source  countries and the euro area and
could  therefore  be  modelled  economically,  policies  play  a  large  role  in  controlling
migration  and  the  actual  outcomes  will  depend  to  a  large  extent  on  how  much
immigration  is  deemed  politically  acceptable.  It should be noted that the projection
only covers legal immigrants  who are also entitled to enter the labour market.
Demographic  projections  should  be  treated with  a  considerable  degree  of caution.
Past expernence  with population  projections reveals  that forecasters  typically  assume
demographic  trends  to  revert  to  some  trend  level  observed  In  the  past.3 As  a
consequence,  forecasts  generally  do  not  capture  systematic  changes  in
demographically relevant behaviour,  such as fertility or migration decisions.
Implications for public pension systems
Most pension systems  can broadly be categorised into three different  pillars, although
their  specific  design varies  considerably  across  countries.4 The  first pillar is  a public
pay-as-you-go pension system where social security  contributions from current labour
income provide the means  for current pension payments.  In many  countries  the first
pillar pay-as-you-go  system provides a basic income for pensioners, in some countries
it  represents  the  major  part  of the  pension  system.  The  second  pillar  consists
generally  of  occupational  pension  schemes  on  a  funded  basis,  i.e.,  participants'
contnbutions  are invested  and pensions  are paid out to the specific  participant  from
the  accumulated  capital  including  capital  gains.  Individual  voluntary  arrangements
through  savings  or  insurance  contracts  represent  the  third  pillar  for  pension
provision.
Public pay-as-you-go  pension  systems  have grown rapidly in importance throughout
the  past  century.  Public  pension  expenditure  relative  to  GDP  in  the  euro  area
3 See R  Lee and S. Tuljapurkar  (2001)
4 A  categorisation  mto  three  pillars  was  first  popularised  by  the World  Bank  (1994)  and  has  been
applied in  a wide range of studies although spectfic classifications  vary
7countries  rose  from  less  than  2%  in  1920  to  more  than  12%  in  1993.5  This
development  reflects rising generosity and the continuous widening of these systems,
culminating  in  almost  complete  coverage  of  the  old  age  population  in  several
countries.  Reasons  for the rising irnportance  of public pay-as-you-go  systems  include
its  political  attraction  due  to  the  low  initial  cost  of  setting  up  such  systems  in
particular  in  times  of  growing  populations.  Another  benefit  from  the  historical
perspective  may  lie  in  their  mdependence  from long-term  pnvate  sector  contracts.
Such  contracts  had  been  repeatedly  invalidated  economically  due  to  wars  and
inflation  in  Europe,  making  the  long-term  public  commitments,  which  underlie
public pay-as-you-go  systems, appear more durable.
The increase in the dependency ratio described above puts pressure on pay-as-you-go
pension  systems,  which  are  the  major  source of old age  pensions  in  the  euro area.
With  a declimng  ratio  of labour force relative to  the number of pensioners,  the tax
base shrinks while  the number of recipients  increases, leaving policymakers  to adjust
the system through reductions  in benefits and increases in contributions. It should be
noted  that  in  the  present  situation  debt-financing  of the  gap  between  pension
contributions  and  payments  does  not  represent  a  viable  alternative.  First,
governments  of the euro area  have  committed  themselves  to refrain from  excessive
public  deficits.  And  second,  given  the  public  knowledge  of  the  pension  system
dynamics,  participants  in  financial  markets  would  at  some  point  anticipate  the
urLsustainabllity  of delaying pension  system reform and require higher risk premia  on
new debt. Indeed, international ratmng agencies  are starting to take a closer look at the
impact of ageing on long term fiscal sustainability.
Reforms  can  focus  on  all  elements  of pay-as-you-go  systems.  Regarding  benefits,
possible measures include  reductions  of replacement  rates and pensionable  incomes,
as well as other tightening of eligibility  criteria. On the contributions  side, increases  in
the contribution  rates  and a widening of the tax base through increases  in registered
labour  are  possible.  One  strategy  that  effectively  combines  adjustments  on  the
benefits  and the contributions side consists  in increasing  the retirement age, inducing
an  increase  in  the  supply  of  labour  as  well  as  a  reduction  in  the  number  of
prospective pensioners.
However,  the  scale  of the  necessary  adjustment  of pay-as-you-go  parameters  may
sirnply  be  too  large  to  make  a  solely  parametric  reform. a  sufficient  solution.  For
example,  as European  tax  and socal  contribution rates are already  high, any further
increase  may  result in  sizeable  reductions  in  labour  supply.  Furthermore,  such  an
approach  could  further  harm  intemational  competitiveness.  Significant  cuts  in
benefits,  on  the other  hand, would likely  be politically  difficult  to implement  with
growing numbers of relatively old voters.
An altemative approach  to secure future pensions  consists in covering the decline in
labour, which lies at the root of the problem, through an increase in capital available
for  funding  pension income.  The higher  stock of assets  for pension  funding,  held
domestncally  or  abroad,  would have  two  beneficial  effects  for  the pension  system:
overall pension income would rise, generating scope to reduce pensions from pay-as-
you-go systems. In addition, the accumulated assets could be depleted to some extent
when  large  cohorts  retire.  The  effectiveness  of this  approach  to  pension  reform
hinges  on  the increase  in  the  stock  of assets  underlying  the  pension  system.  This
increase  generally  requires  higher  domestic  saving.  Conversely,  if  the  additional
5 See  Tanzt  and  Schuknecht  (2000),  Chapter  3,  for the  data  and  a more  extensive  discussion  of the
hlstoncal  aspects. Coverage  is partial.private  savings  serve merely to finance government  deficits,  aggregate  saving wlll not
rise and there  wlll be no augmentation  of the  asset stock  to finance  future pension
needs.
Strengthening of funding m pension systems can also be expected to induce a number
of additional  effects,  which  support  growth  and thus  alleviate  the pension  problem.
First,  the direct lnk between  individual  contributions  and pension  entitlements  m a
funded system can be expected to reduce the perceived  tax burden of current pension
systems,  thus easing  distorting  effects  on  the  labour market.  Second,  the  increased
flow  of resources  mto  professionally  managed  pension  funds  should  lead  to  a
deepening  of capital  markets  and  to  hlgher  efficiency  in  financial  intermediation.
Finally,  to the  extent  that the accumulation  of capital  induces  positive  spillovers  on
productivity,  fully funded systems may provide an additional impact on growth. While
the  above  effects  could in  principle  also  be  generated  through  individual  reforms
outside  a  move to  pension  funding,  the latter's  attraction  derives  from  its inherent
lnk with these additional benefits.
In addition  to the  above  macroeconomic  effects,  a  shift  to  funding  may affect  the
exposure  to various  risks by each individual  participant.  In particular,  a move  toward
private  funding would replace  the risk  of the individual  internal rate of return being
decided  by  politicians  in  a  public pay-as-you-go  system  by market determined  asset
return  risks.  In  addition,  a  move  from  public  to  private  provision  of  pension
administration  changes  the  legal  basis  for  the  participants.  As  a  consequence,  the
regulatory  and supervision  framework  would  need  to  be adjusted  in  parallel  to the
strengthening of funded pension arrangements.
3  Pensions  and institutions
3.1  Euro area public pension systems
Main Features
The great  majority of the Member  States  offer labour market-based  public pension
schemes (see for details Economic Policy Committee, 2001 and 2002). For the private
sector, these typically represent  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  systems, which  in some cases
are  partly  financed  by  the  state  budget  (i.e.  in  Belgium,  Germany,  Greece,  Spain,
France,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Austria,  and  Portugal).  Such  systems  are  generally
"earnings-related",  but can also provide the entire old age population with an identical
pension  for all  ("flat rate"). This second approach mainly characterises  countries with
well-developed  private second pillar schemes, like Ireland and the Netherlands.
As  for  public  sector  pension  schemes,  in  three  Member  States,  namely  Belgium,
Germany,  and  Greece,  the  regime  for  civil  servants  is  financed  only by  the  state
budget,  whereas  in  Ireland  the  scheme  for  the  public  sector  is  entirely  PAYG.
Remaining  countries  are  characterised  by  a  system  that is pardy  PAYG  and partly
financed by state budgets  (see table 2).  Second pillar  schemes  are rarely mandatory in
either the public or the private sectors, whereas  individual voluntary  schemes  remain
generally negligible.
Eligibility requirements
The minmmum  age requirement  for  old age pensions  is  generally  65  years  across  the
majority of European Countries. Exceptions  are:
9I  Portugal, where the public sector requirement is 60 years or altematively  36 years
service;
Greece, where the minimum age for women is 60 m the private sector and 55 for
civil servants;
France, with 60 for men and women in both the private and the public sector;
S  Italy, where the minimum retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women.
Table 2  Euro Area Pension Systems
B  D  EL  E  F  IRL  I  L  NL  A  P  FIN
FIRST PILLAR
General
L niversal  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes
Labotir-market-based  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes
Private sector
Mandatory  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  - Yes  Yes  Yes
PAY(;/FFISF'  PAYG/  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG/  PAYG  - PAYG/  PAYG/  PAYG/
SF  /SF  /SF  /SF  /SF  SF  /SF  SF  SF  FF
Public sector
Mandatory  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  - Yes  Yes  Yes
PAY(;/FF/SF*  SF  SF  SF  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG  PAYGI  PAYG/  - PAYGI  PAYGI  PAYG/
/SF  /SF  SF  SF  SF  SF  FF
Selfeamployed
Mandatory  Yes  Yes  Yes+  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Ycs  - Yes  Yes  Yes
PAY(3/FF/SF  PAYG/  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG  PAYG/  PAYG/  - PAYG/  PAYG/  PAYG/
SF  /SF  /SF  /SF  /SF  SF  SF  SF  SF  SF
SECOND PILLAR
Private sector
Mandatory  No  No  No  No  Yes+  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No
PubUc sector
Mandatory  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No
Notes:
- (Not applicable)
PAYCG (Pay as you go); FF (Fully funded),  SF (State financed)
*  The basic  scheme is mandatory whereas the complementary  scheme is voluntary.
+  For part of the pnvate sector.
Source  Economic Policy Commiiiee (2001)
Estimates  for  the  year  2000  provided  by  Member  States  (Economic  Policy
Comrnittee, 2002)  show that average  effective retirement  ages for old age pensions in
2000 ranged from 60.5 years in Greece to 65.7 years in Portugal.
Requirements  for  the  minimum  number  of  contribution  years  remain  more
heterogeneous,  ranging from no lower limit for the length of employment,  as for the
earnings-related  system in  Finland,  to Italy's  19  year requirement in both the public
and  private  sectors  for  earnings-related  and  mixed  systems.  Early  retirement  is
possible  in  the  great  majority  of the  Member  States,  although  specific  provisions
generally depend on the gender of the applicant and the sector of employment.
Indexation and taxation
Indexation  rules for existing benefits  (see  table  3)  can be broadly divided into three
groups, namely i) indexation to prices (Spain, Italy and Luxembourg); ii)  indexation to
(net)  wages  (Germany);  iii)  mixed  indexation  or ad hoc  systems  (Belgium,  Greece,
Portugal, France,  Ireland, Netherlands,  Austria  and  Finland). Regarding  the pension
benefit  level  for future pensioners,  this  is  calculated  using  an explicit  indexation  to
10prices  or wages  in  flat rate  systems.  In  earnings related  systems  the  pension  benefit
level  for future pensioners  largely depends  on the wages  until retirement,  so that the
pension  benefits  are  implicitly  following  an  indexation  to  wages.  With  regard  to
taxation, pensions  are  generally  treated  as personal  labour  mcome,  with  deductions
being allowed in some countries  (Belgium, Spain, Netherlands,  Portugal and Finland).
Table 3  Euro Area Indexation Schemes  and Taxation Regimes
B  For pnvate sector  automatic indexation  to pnces for benefits  and fixed  Normal taxation regime but deductions
transfers and to wages for ceilmgs. some limited targeted  increases of  allowed
benefits in real terms  are possible
For CIvil servants: automatic  indexation to wages for benefits
*  Indexation to net wages in the previous year  In 2000 and 2001,  temporanly  Taxed as "other income" in the
indexed to pnces  Refers to General Statutory  Pension  Scheme  income  tax
EL  Pnmary pensions for state and private sector employees are linked to  Taxed as personal  labour income
increases in  public sector wages  For the self employed and the
professionals (as well  as for the supplementary  pensions) increases  in
pensions are ad hoc
E  Indexation to projected  pnce increases with lump-sum  compensation  in case  Taxed as labour income. Favourable tax
actual inflation  is higher than projected  one.  treatment for private  funds
F  For Regime  General,  indexation to projected price increase  with lump-sum  Subject to special taxes (6.2% and 0.5%)
compensation  in case actual  inflation is higher  than projected  For civil  Complementary pensions  are subject to a
servants, indexation to wages of public employees,  supplementary health contnbution (I  per
cent).  All pensions  are included  in  the
household  taxable income
IRL  Pension increases  are decided dunng the budgetary  process and are usually  Subject to income tax.
ahead of inflation
I  In general, full indexation  to prices (CPI index)  Partial indexation  to pnces  Taxed as wage income,  but pensions below
for higher pensions,  a minimum amount (if  the pensioner  has no
other income) are tax-exempt
L  Pensions automatisally  indexed to pnce developments  Adjustment to  Social security benefits are treated  as
wages by special law  wages
NL  The public pension  benefit is  linked to the minimum  wage  level. For almost  Public pension benefits are taxed as labour
all occupational  schemes,  indexation is contingent on the financial  income. For occupational  schemes,
development  of the related  pension fund  15 percent of occupational  contributions are tax deductible and
schemes  are indexed to pnces and 65 per cent to wages  benefits are taxed as labour income
Persons above 65 years are exempt from
contributions  to the AOW  Retums from
pension  funds are tax-exempt.
A  On an ad hoc basis,  reflecting the development  of net wages, by and large  Taxed  as personal income taxation.
P  For the public sector, the indexation  scheme  is related to public employees'  Taxed  as wage  income beyond  a certain
wages  Conversely,  for the pnvate sector  the indexation  scheme is  ad hoc  threshold
FIN  Indexation to prices (CPI) for the national pension  scheme and to a  Taxed according to the rules of general
weighted average of wage and pnce changes  for the eaming-related  pension  income taxation  Small pensions are
scheme,  entitled to special pension deductions
Source: Economic Policy Cornmiltee (2001)
Institutions and structural co-ordination
A  comprehensive  strategy to examine the economic  and social implications of ageing
has been put  in place  at the European  level  (see table  4).  This  strategy  is based  on
existLng  institutional  arrangements,  such  as  the Broad  Economic  Policy  Guidelines
(BEPG) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP),  as well as the adoption of the new
"open  method  of co-ordination"  in  the  domain  of pensions  policy.  Reflecting  the
need  for  reforms  and  to  provide  more  substantnal  guidance  on  policies,  the  EU
agreed  in  2001  on  the  so-called  three-pronged  strategy  to  cope  with  the projected
pressures  due to population ageing.  The strategy was first reflected in the 2001 BEPG
11and  comprises  three broad  objectives,  namely  to raise  employment rates,  to  reduce
government  debt rapidly  and  to reform  pension  systems,  including  through  greater
rehlance on funding.
Table 4  European Institutions and Policy  Committees Related to Pensions Systems
European Commiss,on  council
ECOFIN  Employment and Social  Policy (ESP)
-monitors national  penson reform  processes
-rendmends Broad  Economic  Policy Gsadelmes
-p oposes  Employment  Gudelies  and  Broad Econonrc Policy Guidelnes and mulitlateral  Emiployment  process  aid open  method  of coordcnanon
recoommendatons  sorveiliace  process  applied to social  protecon, social integration and  pessions
-acntnbutes to jomt Councl/Cormnssion  report  Stability and  Grow  Pact
assessmig  nasonal  pension  strategies
works with advisory  conmmittees  on  specific aspects
-I  ses  with European  Social  Parmers  and  Economic  Pohey  Commeut  e (EPC)
rele,ant NGOs  -assists  the  Coinicil  nd the Comnission i  the ussessrnuat  Social Protetion Committee (SPC)
of national pension  strategies,  with a  focus on the  economic  -assists  the council aid the Comission  im the assesstnent
and  budgetary  intpIcauons of pensions  systems  as  part of the  of natonal  passion strategies with  a  particuiar focus  on  the
emululate serverilance  process  (Artcle 99  of  the Treaty)  adeqi.acy  of peasions  and  adaptaton to  charcging  society
-assiss the  Council  in draftng the joim CouncillConmiession  as  part of  the open  method  of c-ordination
report  on penoon reformns  assists  the Council in drfing the joint Council/Comrnassion
-develops  indicators, particularly for the  lang-term  repon on  penason  reforns
finanial  sustamnability  of pesson systems  and  prepares  -develops  idicaors, partcularly for the dequacy md
simulations to  be  cared out by Member States  and  adaptability of pnsion systens
mwil  work jointly with the  SPC  on  implemenong the open  will work jointly with the EPC  on smplementing  the open
method  of co-ordination with regard  to pensions.  meshod  of coordiatiotn with regard  to pensions
Ecomnoic  and  Fnancial Cottmittee  Employment Cotnntitpe (EMCO)
(EFC)  -assis  the  Council  nd Co  -nuss.n  i  the asssnesat of
-asssts  the  Concil m Its work mm  the BEPG  progress  under  the  European  Employment  stategy and  in
-assts the Council in its  work on Stability and  parocular the  evolutton of  enmploynent  rates
Convergence  Programmers
Europea  Porhaenoi
i-  s  being  kept ifonred by the Council and  the  European  Comnmssion
Eiwopean Counril
-gives  genera  poibtical  guidelines and  assesses  progress  at Spnng meeting
Source:  Comnissitot  of the European  Communities (2001)
E:isting Institutional Arrangements
The BEPG are, by the power of the Treaty, at the centre of the economic  policy co-
ordination process.  They provide a  framework  for the definition of the overall policy
objectives  and  orientations  for  the Union.  In  this,  they  consolidate  the existing  co-
ordination  processes  (Luxembourg,  Cologne and Cardiff)  and form the reference  for
the  multilateral  surveillance  procedure,  under  which  the  consistency  of  national
economic  policies  is  monitored.  Reflecting  also  the  economic  and  budgetary
challenges  posed  by  the  ageing  populations,  these  "guidelines"  have  been
strengthened  over  the years, putting  additional  emphasis  on the medium  and long-
tei-m  implications  of structural  policies,  as well  as  on reforms  designed  to promote
economic  growth  potential. To  this  aim,  they now increasingly  emphasise  the need
for  enhanced  sustainability  of the  national  pension  systems,  to  be achieved  via  the
implementation  of additional  labour  market  reforms,  sustained  reduction  of debt
ratios, as well as systemic pension reforms induding funding.
Regarding  the SGP,  the revised code of conduct  (2001)  approved  by the Economic
and  Financial  Committee  and  endorsed  by  the  Ecofin  Council  requires  additional
information  on  long-term  sustainability  to  be  included  in  countries'  stability  and
convergence  programmes.  Specifcally,  an  additional  table  on  the  "long-term
sustainabilhty  of public finances"  has been  compiled  since  the 2001/2002  round  of
the programmes.  Its aim  is  to  highlight  the  expected  total  expenditure  on old  age
pensions and health  costs over a fixed projection period (2000-2050),  as well as make
explicit  several  key underlying assumptions  such as participation  and unemployment
rates  and labour  productivity  growAth.  The revised  code  of conduct  also  prescribes
12that the format of the programme updates  should be increasingly  standardised, while
their  content  should  focus  more  extensively  on  an  examination  of the  quality  of
national  public finances.  The peer assessment  of stability programmes  in the Ecofin
council also covers  this sustainability  analysis.
The Open Method of Co-ordination
Alongside  the framework of the existing institutional  arrangements  and as  a new tool
in  the  area  of policy  co-ordination,  the  "open  method of co-ordination"  is  being
applied in the pension domain. This method is intended to involve i) setting common
objectives,  ii)  translating such objectives into national policy strategies  and, as  part of
a mutual learning process, iii)  monitoring progress  on the basis  of commonly agreed
and  defined  sustamability  indicators.  Its  aim  is  to  provide  an  mtegrated  reporting
framework on issues concerning  "best practices" for future pension provision, as well
as  an  EU  framework  to develop  a  common  understanding  of national  strategies.
Moreover,  it is designed  to enhance the provision of detailed information and analysis
regarding  national  pension  strategies  that  will  feed  into  the  formulation  of policy
recommendations within the BEPG. The Stockholm European Council (March 2001)
has  stressed that  "[in the pension  domain]  the potential  of the  open method  of co-
ordination  should  be  used  to the  full",  albeit  in a way which  does  not infrnge the
pnnciple of subsidiarity.
Reports
As  part of its response  to the  mandate  by the Ecofin  for  a  comprehensive  report
assessing  the  overall  impact  of ageing  populations  on public  finances,  the Working
Group  on Ageing  of the  EPC  (AWG)  produced  the report  "Budgetary  challenges
posed  by  ageing  populations"  (Economic  Policy  Committee,  2001).  The  working
group, in a  first step, developed long-term quantitative  simulations  through 2050  for
pension  expenditure,  followed  by projections  over the  same period of the impact  of
ageing on public expenditure  on health and care for the elderly. In a second step, the
group  developed  possible indicators  considering  how the projections  for age-related
public  expenditures  could be used to examine  the overall long-term  sustainability of
public  finances.  The  analysis  of  the  working  group  showed  that  in  a  number  of
Member  States  further reforms  are  needed in  view of their  commitment  to  ensure
sound public finances  at all times.
A report on the overall assessment of the impact of ageing on public finances is being
prepared, presenting a comprehensive  survey of the projected impact of demographic
changes.  In  addition,  the  major  aspects  of national  pension  systems  and  reform
strategies  as presented in the national  strategy reports under the open method of co-
ordination  are  summarised  in  a  forthcoming  joint  report  of the  Economic  Policy
Commuttee  and  the  Social  Protection  Committee  on  adequate  and  sustainable
pensions.
4  Simulation results
The simulation  exercise in this section  proceeds in four broad steps. After discussing
the  simulation method  and assumptions,  we  first analyse  a baseline  scenario  on  the
basis  of  assumptions  that  have  been  widely  applied  in  the  European  literature.
Second,  we  study  the  impact  of adopting  more  realistic  assumptions  regarding
employment  and  interest  rates.  Third, we  will  show that  even  under the  optimistic
baseline  scenario  assumptions  a  purely  parametric  reform  of pay-as-you-go  systems
will  not  suffice  to  balance  the  present  value  of public  pension  deficits  beyond  the
13forecast  horizon.  In  the  final  step,  a  more  comprehensive  reform  scenario  is
presented  which  yields  a  financially  viable  pay-as-you-go  system  through  a  move
towards partial funding.
Simulation method
l'o generate  pension projections  for the individual  countries, we employ the PROST
(Pensions  Reforrn Options  Simulations Toolkit)  software  from the World Bank. This
application  is  programmed  m  Visual  Basic  for Applications  and produces  detailed
projections  in  Excel spreadsheets  for the development of pension  systems based  on
the specification  of the relevant parameters  in a base year and their development over
tume.  The most important inputs  relate to the demographic  structure, labour market
assumptions  and  the  specific  design  of  the  pension  system  under  consideration.
TI'hese  are complemented  by macroeconomic  variables,  such  as productivity growth
and interest  rates, which are assumed exogenous.  The software  allows pay-as-you-go
systems  and  funded  schemes  to  be  modelled,  as  well  as  a  wide  range  of reform
scenarios.
Ilhe  euro area  aggregate-referred  to as the  "aggregate"  in this survey-covers  nine
countries,6 which  represent  96.1%  of the  euro  area  GDP and  96.3%  of the  total
public pension  expenditure  of the  12 euro  area  countries.  The projections  are based
on the actual pension system data for 1999, the last year for which a complete data set
for all  countries was  available. However,  more recent data were used where  available,
in  particular  with  regard  to  changes  in  pension  system  generosity.  The  projection
period ranges  from  2000 to 2050. The  projection is based on the aggregation  of the
results from individual country models, which replicate  the mam features of national
pension  systems.  In  particular,  all  country  models  cover pension  arrangements  for
ptivate  sector workers, with the coverage  depending  on the data availability  and the
degree  of  fragmentation  of  national  arrangements.  In  most  cases,  disability  and
survivor  benefits have been included,  but  early retirement  schemes and  civil  service
pensions  were  mostly  excluded.7  The  PROST simulation  represents  approximately
680% of the total pension expenditure as covered by the AWG.8
Assumptions  and input variables
The projections  are  based  on  the  baseline  Eurostat  demographic  forecasts,  which
have been discussed in section  2. Key economic parameters  such as growth rates and
real interest rates are applied  across  countries, which is similar to the AWG approach.
Pensions  are calculated before  taxes so that, depending on the specific characteristics
of the  tax  system,  total  projected  fiscal  liabilites  could  be  reduced  by  rising  tax
revenues  from  pensions.9 Labour  market  assumptions  are  based  on  a  common
general  framework,  but  exhibit  some  variation  across  countries.  Additional  input
variables are based on national sources. 1 (
Participation and unemployment  rates
Labour market  participation  is  projected to  increase,  in particular  for women.  This
effect  can  be seen across  all age  cohorts, most strongly for older workers aged  55 to
64,  and  for young women.  Although increases are  foreseen  across  all countries,  they
are  very  different  in  magnitude.  According  to AWG  data,  the  increase  in  female
labour market  participation  from  2000 to 2050  ranges  from  1.7%  to  19.3%  for the
6 Belgium, Germany,  Spam, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Finland
7 Country details can be found m the Appendix
8 In 2000, the weighted  average of euro area pubhc pension  expenditure  was 11.6% of GDP according
to the AWG  and 7 9%  m the PROST models.
9 It should be noted, however, that in many countries effective  tax rates  on pensions are relatLvely low.
10 A table with malor variables  is provided  in Appendix II.
14age group  15 to 54, and from 1.8%  to 34% for the age group 55 to 64 years.  There is
also an increase  for men, which affects mostly the cohort aged 55 to 64, although this
is not experienced  by all countries.  Unemployment  rates are assumed to  fall to their
structural  levels. The unemployment  rate is projected  to drop from currently  9.9 % to
7.1%  m  2020  and,  on  a  slower  path,  to  6.2%  by  2050.  In  line  with  this,  the
employment  ratio (total employees  as a ratio of 15 to 64 year olds)  is  expected to rise
from 61%  to 68%.
Macroeconomic  assumptions
Labour productivity growth is  projected to converge to a level of 1
3
/4%  for almost all
countries  after  2020,  in  line  with  the  AWG  approach.  Until  that  time,  higher
productivity  growth  is assumed,  particularly  in  Spain and  Ireland.  As  a result of the
employment  and productivity  assumptions,  real GDP growth is projected to decrease
steadily during the first half of the projection  period from a current 2.6%  to a level of
1.3%  to  1.5%,  where  it will  remain  through the  end of the projection  period.  Real
wages are  expected  to grow in  line with  labour productivity.  The real interest rate is
assumed  constant  at  4%  throughout  the  projection  period.  Inflation  converges  to
between  1.5%  and 2% in all countries.
Pension system finance
The projections  are based on hypothetical contribution  rates, to achieve  a comparable
financing structure across  countries. The  financing arrangements of several European
pension  schemes  are  complex  and  intransparent,  with  participants'  contributions
being  supplemented  with  transfers  from  the  general  budget  as  well  as  from  other
parts  of  the  social  security  administration.  To  achieve  comparability,  hypothetical
contribution  rates  were  calculated  by  dividing  total  pension  payments  by  the wage
sum of effective contrbutors  in the base year. Implicitly, this approach  supposes that
the national  schemes  are pure balanced  pay-as-you-go  systems  with all  expenditures
being  financed  through wage-based  contributions  at  a  fixed  rate  across wage  levels.
These  hypothetical  contributon  rates were  then  kept  constant  over  the  projection
horizon.
The  assumption  that  pension  systems  are  balanced  at  the  start  of the  projection
period means  to disregard  the  deficits  that  are currently  generated  in many pension
systems as  contributions  already  fall  short of expenditures.  These deficits  add to the
future  deficits  estmated below,  so that the actual fiscal burden arising from  pension
system would exceed the estimations.
Furthermore,  the financmg  side of pension  systems  is  assumed  to be integrated  into
general  budgets  in the  sense  that the systems  neither  receive interest  on assets  held
nor  pay  interest  on  debt  accumulated.  In  other  words,  pension  system  surpluses
reduce  the  government's  overall  interest  burden  while  pension  system  deficits
increase  it. However,  for the reform  scenarios  discussed below pension  surpluses are
assumed  to accrue  to the pension  system  so that they can be used to finance  future
pension obligations.
Results  for the baseline  scenario
Simulation  results point to a  substantial  increase  in pension expenditure  in  the euro
area,  from  a current level of 7.9%  to 12.1% of GDP (see  table 5).  While expenditure
will remain  almost  constant  over  the next  decade,  a steep  rise is  forecast  to  start in
2010. This will bring expenditure to 10.6%  by 2030 and to 12%  by 2045  (see chart 2).
At the country  level, the increase  in expenditure  varies significantly  both in size  and
tming.  For  example,  the  largest  increase  is  recorded  in  Spain,  amounting  to  9.0
15percentage points.
Table 5  Baseline scenario, e-9
2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050  absolute
change (ppt
_______  _______  of GDP)
Curent balaice (%  of GDP)  00  00  -10  -3.1  -4 3  -4.5  -45
Pensioexpenditre (°/ of  GDP)  7.9  7.8  8.7  10.6  118  12.1  42
Dependencyratio  243  27.7  32 7  412  491  50.2  63
Emiploymen  ratio |  1.64  1.58  1  55  1.54  149  1.47  -0.9
Average pnsion/ GDP per morker  16 5  15.2  148  14.4  142  142  -12
Eligibility ratio  120  1.17  116  1.17  113  1.16  -0.2
Residual  02
Chart 2: Baseline  scenario  (e-9):  Pension
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In line with this development, the current balance of the pension systems is projected
to turn negative. While at present the systemn is balanced by assumption, it will start to
incur deficits by approximately 2010, which rise to a level of about 4.5% of GDP per
year  by 2050. The present value of the deficits is equal to 50.6% of GDP, which can
be interpreted as an additional  (implicit)  debt burden on top of governments'  explicit
debt stock averaging around 67% of GDP in 2001.11 The present value of the deficits
is equivalent  to a constant negative  annuity of 1.7%  of GDP; in other words, current
revenues  of  the  pension  system  would  need  to  be  increased  permanently  by  1.7
percentage  points of GDP  to achieve  a zero present value of deficits through  2050.
Note however,  that large  deficits  arise also beyond  the  forecast  horizon. Thus, if a
longer  period  were  taken  into  account,  the  permanent  increase  necessary  for  a
balanced  system  would  be hlgher.  As  an  altemative  measure  for the  degree  of the
upcoming financing problems, the necessary contribution rate to maintain a balanced
pay-as-you-go  system in every period would need to nse from below 30% to close to
40"/o by the end of the projection  period.  Similarly, continuous  balance would require
average benefits to fall by dose to one half, all other variables remaining equal.
"i  For analyses of fiscal  sustamnablhty, pubhc assets, as  currendy accumulated in some countries, need to
be taken into account.
16Should  demographic  developments  turn  out  less  favourable  than  in  the  above
projection,  the  fiscal  burden  could  increase  substantially.  In  their  stochastic
simulations  of US  fiscal  policies through  2070, Lee  and Tuljapurkar  (2001)  report  a
95% confidence interval for tax rates to balance the fiscal accounts ranging from 25%
to 53%  around the median  esumate of 38%,  indicating  that prudent  policies  should
take additional precautions.
To analyse the individual effects  driving the pension expenditure  ratio to GDP, it can
be  decomposed  into  four  explanatory  factors,  namely  the  dependency  ratio,
employment,  benefit generosity and eligibility.  The dependency  effect is measured by
the ratio of the population over 64 relative to the working age population between  15
and  64. The employment effect is measured  by the share of total  employment in the
working  age  population  from  15  to  64.  The  average  pension  relative  to GDP per
worker is shown  as the benefit variable.  Finally,  eligibility is given  by the ratio of the
number  of pensions relative  to the  population  over 64. Algebraically,  the  following
formula  applies:
pension expenditure ratio  = (dependency ratio)  * (employment ratio)-' * (average
pension) * (eligibility ratio)
Table  5  also  shows  the  contribution  of the  four  components  to  the  increase  in
pension  expenditure. The  contribuuon  to the absolute  percentage  point change  (last
column)  has  been  approximated  by log-linearisation.  The  total  increase  in  pension
expenditure of 4.2 percentage points of GDP is driven by the rise in the dependency
ratio,  while  the  other  factors  exert  smaller  offsetting effects.  The dependency  ratio
increases  steadily  from  a  current  24.3%  to  a  level  of approximately  50%  by  2040,
where  it remains  thereafter.  This development  is  equally  due  to  a  decrease  in the
working age population  and an increase  in the age group over 64. Ceteris paribus this
evolution of the dependency ratio would cause pension expenditure to increase by 6.3
percentage  points.
In line with the labour market assumptions outlined above, employment increases  at a
relatively  continuous  rate.  This is  mainly  due  to higher  female participation  and to
higher  participation  of  the  older  age  cohorts  in  general.  The  declining  inverse
employment  ratio  as  shown  in  table  5  represents  a  corresponding  increase  in
employment.  The employment  effect alone would reduce the pension expenditure  by
0.9 percentage points.
Average  pensions diminish  from  16.5%  of GDP per employee  to 14.2%  by the end
of  the  projection  period,  a  reduction  of 15%.  This  development  reflects  recent
pension  reforms  and  also  the indexation  of pensions  to inflation,  which  leads  to  a
declne in the level of pensions relaive  to wages. It is worth noting that a  fall in this
benefit  ratio is not equivalent  to a  fall in pensions  in real terms. The relatively lower
benefits  would  result  in  a  fall  of  pension  expenditure  of  1.2  percentage  points
regardless of other factors, making it the largest offsetting effect.
The eligibility ratio is projected to follow a volatile trend and fall marginally from 1.20
to  1.16.  It  accounts  for  the  number  of pensions  rather  than  for  the number  of
pensioners  and  is  higher  than  one  as  there  are  many  cases  in  which  a  pensioner
receives  more than one pension. The change in the eligibility ratio  reflects two largely
offsetting developments. On one hand, eligibility criteria are being tightened in many
pension  systems.  On  the  other  hand,  increased  labour  market  participation,  m
particular  by women,  leads  to  a  hlgher number  of entitlements.  The change  in the
17eligibility ratio over time would account for a reduction in pension expenditure  by 0.2
percentage points regardless of other factors.
The results  are  in line with  the projections  of the AWG.  Based on a  wider coverage
of national  pension  systems  but  including  the  same  set  of countries,  the  AWG
aggregate  pension expendcture  nses by 3.9 percentage  points of GDP, from 11.7%  in
2000  to  15.6%  in  2050.  The very  similar percentage  point  increase  in  the  PROST
simulation  with  a  smaller  coverage  irnplies  that the components  not covered  in the
I'ROST simulation remain  broadly constant relative to GDP. This is indeed what the
national projections  for the Working Group indicate,  as rising expenditures  in some
components, such as civil servants' pensions, are offset by decreasing expenditures  on
other items, including disability and early retirement  pensions.
Realistic baseline  scenario
However,  the  AWG  projections  are  optimistic  on  at  least  two  accounts,  namely
regarding  assumptions  on  smaller  pension  expenditure  items  and  labour  market
dievelopments.  In  addition,  lowering  the  assumed  real  interest  rate  to  3%  has  a
nmaterial  impact  on the results. With more  realistic  assumptions  on employment  and
the  interest  rate  level,  the  present  value  of pension  deficits  turns  out  some  40
percentage points of GDP higher.
Regarding  the  first  point,  the  implicit  assumption  that  the  expenditure  items  not
captured in  the PROST model remain  constant  relative to GDP reflects  underlying
policy changes  that are not guaranteed.  Most importantly,  offsetting increases  in civil
service pensions  through savings on disability and early retirement schemes requires a
tightening in their eligibility criteria that may be politically difficult to achieve.
Second,  the AWG  approach  is  based  on  optimistic  labour market  assumptions,  in
particular  regarding  the  increase  in  labour  participation  rates  and  the  decline  in
unemployment.  To  gain  an  insight  into  the  importance  of  the  labour  market
assumptions for the above results,  the base model, which assumes  a significant rise in
labour  participation  rates,  has  been  rerun  with  the  assumption  of no  changes  in
labour  market  variables.  In  particular,  participation  rates  remain  flat,  as  do
unemployment  rates  and  the effective  retirement  age.  Replacement  rates  have been
adjusted to reflect the shorter working histories  of new pensioners  in this set-up. The
realistic baseline  scenario was implemented  for the four largest euro area countries  (e-
4:  Germnany, France,  Italy and Spain)  covering close  to 80% of euro  area  GDP and
82% of the total euro area public pension expenditure.
To obtain  an  assessment of the  sensitivity of the  results  with  regard to  the interest
rate assumption,  the realistic baseline  scenario is based  on a real interest rate of 3%.
This  results in  an interest  rate  growth  differential  of around  1l/zo/o  for most of the
projection  period,  in lne  with  an  historical  25  year  average  for  large  euro  area
countries. The effect of the interest rate assumption occurs mainly through  its impact
on the discount factor in the calculation of the present value of the deficits.
The  resulting  realistic  baseline  scenario  is  compared  with  the  original  baseline
scenario  for  the  four  major  countnes  (e-4)  in  table  6  and  chart  3.  Comparing  the
baseline scenario  (e-4) with  that for the full set of nine  countries  (table  5) shows that
the  overall  behaviour  is very  similar.  In  particular,  the  expenditure  pressure  for the
large  countries  is  projected  somewhat  above  the  average.  On  the  other  hand,  the
present value of the pension  deficits is  marginally lower at 47% of GDP. Turning to
the realistic baseline  scenario,  the assumption of flat labour market developments  has
18a substantive impact on the results.  The current  deficit deteriorates  to 5.9%  of GDP
by 2050, about one percentage point more than  mn  the baseline scenario. This  effect is
driven by  the  less  favourable  development  of the employment  ratio,  which  is  only
partly offset by the reduction in the replacement  rate relative  to the baseline scenario.
The  present  value  of deficits  rises  by  about  40  percentage  points  of GDP  to  an
average  of around  87%  of GDP.  This increase  by  around  40 percentage  points  of
GDP  is  driven  in  about  equal  parts  by  the  employment  and  the  mterest  rate
assumption. The  individual  increases  range  from 23 points in France  to  close to  60
points  in Spain. Analogously,  the average  annuity necessary to cover this deficit rises
to 2.5% of GDP.
Table  6  Baseline  scenario vs. realistic baseline scenario, e4
Basehne scenari  (e4)  Realistic  baseline scenario  (e-4)
2000  2002  2050  absolute  2002  2050  absolute
change  change
Current balance (%  of GDP)  0 0  0 0  -4 8  -4 8  -0 1  -5.9  -5  9
Pension expenditure  (ffo of GDP)  8 I  81  12.7  4 6  8 2  13.5  53
Dependency ratio  24 7  25 5  517  27 0  25 5  51  7  27 0
Employnt raho  1.65  1 62  1 46  =  -0 2  X  1.65  1  67  0.0
Avpensiona  / GDP perworker  16.7  16 4  14 4  -2.3  16 4  13 4  -3.3
Eligibility ratio  1 20  119  _  17  0.0  1 19  1 16  0 0
Chart 3: Realistic baseline  scenario v.
baseline  scneario (e4): current balance
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4.5  Partial reform
To  cope with the  fiscal  burden,  parametric  reforms  of pay-as-you-go  systems  have
been  discussed in politcal  and academic  circles.  In the following,  the characteristics
and  results  of one  possible  scenario  are  modelled.  Despite  lookhng  only  at  one
specific set of reforms,  the exercise will show that partial reforms will generally not be
sufficient  to  balance  pension  systems  as  the  necessary  additional  burden  on
participants  is unrealistically  high while  leaving a  substantial financial  gap  at the end
of the projectiorn  period.
The hypothetical  reforms  balance  the national  pension  systems,  i.e., they reduce the
present value of deficits over the projection horizon to zero. This is achieved through
a combination  of changes  in three parameters:  (i) a gradual increase  in the  effective
retirement  age  by one year untl 2010 with unchanged replacement rates;  (ii) a rise in
the contribution  rates  by 10%,  e.g.,  from  30%  to  33%;  and,  finally,  a reduction  in
average  replacement  rates sufficient  to balance  the system,  i.e.,  reducing the present
19value  of deficits  to  zero  in 2002. The  reform  scenario  was implemented  for the e-4
countries with reforms starting in 2002.
IrL  view  of the  diverse  behaviour  of national  pension  schemes,  the  overall  reform
scenario was  adjusted for the indcvidual  countries.  For Italy,  the effective  retirement
age was assumed  to  be unchanged  relative  to the baselne  scenario,  as the reformed
Italian  pension system does not allow for an increase  in the retirement age without an
actuanally  fair  compensation.  This  strongly  reduces  the  potential  impact  of such  a
reform  on  pension  system  finances.  Contribution  rates  for  France  were  left
urnchanged  relative to the baseline  scenario as the total reform need is relatively  small.
The  results  are  presented  in  table  7  and  compared  with  the  respective  baseline
scenario  for the four large countries.
Table 7  Partial reform vs.  baseline scenario,  e-4
= _______________________________  Baseline scenari  (e-4)  Partial reform !  e4)
2000  2002  2050  absolute  2002  2050  absolute
____________________________  ~~~~~~change  change
Cument  balance (%  of GDP)  0 0  0.0  -4 8  -4  8  1 3  -2.8  -2.8
Pension expenditure (%  of GDP)  8 1  8 1  12.7  4 6  75  11.2  3 1
Dependency  ratio  24 7  25.5  51  7  27 0  25.5  51.7  27.0
Employmet ratio  1 65  1 62  146  -0 2  162  1 45  -0.2
Average pension / GDP per work  16 7  16.4  144  -2  3  153  13 0  -3 8
Eligibility ratio  120  1  19  1.17  00  118  1 16  00
The partial reform induces an upward  shift in the current balance as shown in chart 4,
so that the present value of deficits through 2050 is equal to zero. This compares with
a present value of 47% of GDP and a constant negative  annuity of 1.6%  of GDP in
the  baseline  scenario  for the  four  countries  analysed.  The  behaviour  of the balance
over  time  remains  as in  the  baseline  scenario,  exhibiting  a  significant  deterioration
over  the  projection  period.  Note  that  the  distribution  of the  burden  from  lower
average  replacement  rates  is  left  open.  Thus,  lower  benefits  may  be  imposed  on
existing  pensioners  through  a  reduction  in  pension  indexation  or  on  current
cointributors  through lower accrual rates.
The use of the real interest rate of 4% for the calculation  of the present value implies
that the  surpluses generated  during the first half of the projection period are invested
at  this  rate.  Alternatively,  they  can  be  thought  of being  used  to  reduce  explicit
government debt.  Given the  size of the accumulated  surpluses, which  remain below
20% of GDP for all countries,  the latter interpretation has  the favourable  side aspect
thaLt it  takes  care of the problem  of how to invest surpluses  from the  social security
system.  It  should  be  clear,  however,  that  any  shortfall  in  the  return  on  publicly
managed funds relative to the market interest rate, as has been observed historically in
many countries, would increase the overall  burden of the parametric reform.
20Chart 4: Partial reforn  v. baseline  scenario
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The  balancing  of  the  system  is  driven  by  lower  replacement  rates  and  higher
contributions,  but the increase  in the retirement  age has  only  a marginal impact  on
the employment  ratio.  The number of employed  rises by less  than 2% as a result of
the  reform.  Simplistically,  this  can  be  explained  by  the  effect  that  in  the countries
under  study  almost  the  entire  cohort  at retirement  age  starts  to  receive  a  pension
while  only  a  fraction  had  been  working  until  that  date.  Reasons  for  this  include
eligibility  rules  requiring  only  limited  labour  market  participation  throughout  the
entire  career  and  the  existence  of  dependants'  pensions.  Thus,  postponing  the
transition  from work  to pension  by one year adds only relatively  few new employed
to the economy.
However,  the above  scenario  is not viable for two reasons. First,  the assumed rise in
contribution  rates  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  assumption  of significantly  rising
employment rates.  The assumed increase in contribution  rates raises  the hypothetical
aggregate  contribution rate from 33.9% to 36.3%. Higher contribution  rates raise  the
disincentives  to  work  (at  least  in  the  official  economy)  so  that  the  projected
employment  rates  remain  almost  certainly  out of reach in  this  scenario.  This  holds
also for the hypothetical contribution  rate  applied in this  study, as the final mcidence
of  the  financial  burden  of  the  social  security  system  is  concentrated  on  labour
income.
Second,  the reform only balances  the pay-as-you-go  systems through  2050 and leaves
them with substantial deficits after that date. As chart 4 shows, the aggregate  deficit in
2050  is  close  to  2'/2%  of GDP  and  is  deteriorating.  In  other  words,  despite  the
measures  of the partial reform  scenario,  there remains a need for substantial pension
reforms.  On the simplistic  assumption  of no  further  parameter  changes  after 2050,
the aggregate present value of deficits  through 2100 discounted to 2002 exceeds 20%
of GDP.12
While  the above  considerations  refer to a  specific reform scenario,  the overall result
applies  more broadly.  Balancing  a pay-as-you-go  system permanently  in view of the
projected  adverse  demographic  developments  requires  substantial  increases  in
contribution  rates or severe  cuts in benefits, induding through actuarially  unrewarded
increases  in the effective  retirement age.  Specific  reforms can basically  affect only the
distribution of the adjustment burden.
12 The  overall  benefit  of  such  a  reform  would  be  further  reduced  if the  mcrease  m  the  effective
rettrement age was the result of specific tax incenttves
214.6  Comprehensive  reform
In view of the above results, a workable pension reform needs to balance  the pension
system  while providing  strong incentives  for increased  labour market participation.
Strengthenig  incentives  for  labour  market  participation  means  reducing  the  tax
burden on labour. At the same  time, the sustainability of the pension  system requires
that the ensuing drop in revenues be matched by lower benefits.  The move towards a
partially funded pension  system  can  achieve  these  objectives.  In particular,  it allows
current  contributors  to  the  pension  system  to  accumulate  wealth  for  their  own
retirement  while it reduces  tax  distortions  as  contributions  to the  funded pillar  are
perceived  as  savings  rather  than  taxation.  In  such  an  environment,  the  strong
increases  in  employment  as  assumed  in  the  above  simulations  become  a  realistic
p.rojection.
The simulation of the partial shift  to funding has been set up to focus on how future
pensioners will be affected relative to the partial reform scenario.  The most important
reform  parameters  are  the  following.  In all  four  countries, contribution  rates to the
pay-as-you-go  system  are  reduced  immediately  and  permanently  by  6  percentage
points. That amount is invested into a funded pillar which  carries a net return of 4%
after  taxes  and  administrative  costs.  All  working  age  generaions  participate  in  the
partial  shift  to funding. Replacement  rates  for new old age pensioners  are reduced  to
achieve  balance  of the  system,  namely  a  zero  present  value  of deficits.13 Existing
pensioners  remain  unaffected by  the reform,  i.e., their pension  levels  and indexation
mechanisms remain as in the partial reform case. With  a view to making the payment
streams from the  funded pillar  comparable  to  those  from the pay-as-you-go  system,
the  benefits  from  the  funded  pillar  are  expressed  as  hypothetical  annuities.  These
annuities  represent  a  constant  payment  stream  to  the  pensioners  but  cannot  be
be queathed,  which  distinguishes  them  from  actual  annuity  plans  found  in  financial
markets. The indexation  of the hypothetical annuities has been matched to that of the
pay-as-you-go  pensions.  Finally,  the  assumptions  on  effective  retirement  ages  and
labour market developments are as in the partial reform scenario.
Tlhe set up allows  to focus  on one variable  to assess the effects  of the reform,  subject
to the condition that the pay-as-you-go  pillar is balanced. This variable is the ratio of
the replacement  rate for new old age pensioners  in the reform case relative  to that in
the  partial  reform  scenario.  As  existing  pensioners  are  treated  identically  in  both
scenarios  and total contributions  for pension insurance remain unchanged,  the reform
effects  can  be  fully captured  by  the change  in  the  total replacement  rate  for newly
retiring  participants.  Technically,  this  requires  a  recalculation  of the  partial  reform
scenario using the assumption that the system is balanced solely through reductions  in
the replacement rates for new pensioners, rather than in the average replacement  rate
for all existing pensioners  as described in the previous section.
The comprehensive  reform balances  the pay-as-you-go  system through 2050 whereas
the  behaviour of the revised partial reform  scenario  (to account for the adjustment
solely through  replacement  rates  for new retirees)  is  not substantially  changed  from
the  original  partial reform  (see  table  8  and chart  5).  The balancing  of the system is
achieved through a pronounced reduction  in the replacement rate which matches  the
reduction  in  contributions.  The  pay-as-you-go  system  remains  m  balance  through
2100 assuming no further parameter changes.
13 In practice, replacement  rates for  all newly retLring workers  are cut  Irnearly to reduce  expendliture  to
equal revenues.
22Table 8  Partial reform (rev.)  vs.  comprehensive  reform, e-4
l______________  _  |  Partial reform (rev.) (e-4  Comprehensive  reform (e-4)
2000  2002  2050  absolute  2002  2050  absolute
l_________________________  _  l  l  |  change  change
Current balance (%  of GDP)  0 0  0 8  -2 3  -2 3  -0  8  -0 2  -0 2
Pension expenditure (%  of GDP)  81  8 0  10 7  2 6  7 9  7 3  -0 8
Dependency ratio  24 7  25 5  51  7  27 0  25 5  51 7  27 0
EmPloymenvatio  165  1 62  145  -0 2  162  1 45  -0
Average penson /GDP  per worker  16 7  16 3  124  -4 3  16 2  8 5  -82
Eligibilityratio  120  1 18  1 16  00  1 18  1 16  00
Chart 5: Comprehensive  reform v. partial




-1.0  - part-.1
-2.0
-3.0
2000  2010  2020  2030  2040  2050
The  simulations  reveal  that the  partial  shift  to  funding  leaves  some generations  of
future  pensioners  worse  off than  in  the  partial  reform  case.  As  shown  in  chart  6,
replacement rates for new old age pensioners turn out up to 23% lower relative to the
partial  reform  scenario.  In  other  words,  in  the  comprehensive  reform  scenario,
participants retiring before around 2040 will receive lower pensions than in the partial
reform  scenario.  Only  after  that  date  will  the  total  replacement  rate  be  somewhat
higher than in the partial reform scenario. Note that the ratio of the replacement rates
declines somewhat  close to the end of the projection period. This is a result of ageing
within the working age population which also induces by assumption  a higher average
wage  level and, thus,  a lower ratio of the average  annuity to the average wage in the
economy.
23Chart 6: Composite  replacement  rate for new
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Changing the assumption  on the return on investment m  the funded pillar affects  the
long-term  outcome for pensioners, while in  the medium  term  the impact is  limited.
To assess sensitivity  of the results, simulations were run assuming real retums of 3%
and 5%, respectively. As the size of the funded pillar is to a large extent driven by the
effect  of  compound  interest,  the  impact  of  the  altemative  return  assumptions  is
relatively  limited through  around  2025.  With growing  size of the  funded pillar,  the
importance  of  the  return  assumption  becomes  more  important.  By  2050,  total
replacement rates under the high (5%) return assumption exceed those of the baseline
(4%)  by  close  to  20%.  By  contrast,  the  low  (3%)  return  assumption  results  in  a
shortfall  of some  12%, implying that the replacement  rate under the comprehensive
reform scenario  would also fall  short of the replacement  rate under the unsustainable
partial  reform.  This  last  result  reflects  the  fact  that  the pension  system  is  still not
financially  balanced  in  the  partial  reform  scenario,  offering  excessive  retums  and
incurring persistent deficits at the end of the forecast horizon.
TThe  above  set-up  represents  a  polar  case  in  assuming  that  all  working  age
contributors  immediately participate  in the newly establhshed  funded pillar. While this
outcome might be  feasible if participation  is mandatory,  it could be difficult  to find
the  necessary  political  support  for such  an  approach.  In  particular,  older  workers
close to retirement  would  likely be strongly  opposed to  a large  cut in pay-as-you-go
benefits  as  they  have  little  time  to  build  up  assets  in  the  funded  pillar.  Making
participation  voluntary, in particular for older workers, might be more acceptable  (see
Palacios  and  Whitehouse,  1998,  for  a discussion  of the  options). It should  be noted
that a gradual transition towards  a funded pillar would smooth  out replacement  rates
at the cost of additional  fiscal burdens to  finance the continuation of the pay-as-you-
go  system for a part of current workers.
Thle reduction in the replacement rate for some generations with the introduction of a
partially funded system reflects  the basic theoretical  finding that the inherent debt of
pay-as-you-go  systems  always  has  to  be  financed.  The  debt  is  incurred  as  the first
generations  of pensioners in a pay-as-you-go  system receive pension benefits without
having contributed fully to the system. In an ongoing pay-as-you-go  system this debt
is  contnuously rolled over to  following generations.  The interest cost of the debt is
reflected  in  the  rate  of  return  disadvantage  of pay-as-you-go  systems  relative  to
funded  schemes (see Sinn, 2000). A transition to  funding requires the redemption  of
the inherent  debt which imposes  a burden  on current  or future generations.  As long
as  the return  to  funding does  not exceed the  cost of debt  financing  or the shift  to
24funding does not reduce other existing  distortions, the move will always  induce some
net loss  to current or future generations.  Conversely,  the beneficial  effects of a move
to  funding,  e.g.,  through  a  reduction  of  tax  distortions  or  a  higher  return  on
investment, need to offset the above cost if the move is to be favourable.
5  Conclusions
Population ageing is putting pressure  on public pay-as-you-go  pension  systems.  The
scale of such  systems  in the  euro area  makes  significant  reforms  in the  near  future
inevitable.  The need  for reform has  also been  acknowledged  at the  European  level,
where  an  insntutional  framework  for the  momtoring and  co-ordination  of national
pension reform policies is being implemented.
The numerical  projections  in  this  paper  underline  the  urgency  of the problem and
provide an assessment  of the viability of alternative reform approaches.  The pension
projections  for the baseline  scenario are in line with those of the AWG, implying that
the chosen projection  method  is reliable.  Pension  expenditure is projected  to rise  by
more than 4 percentage points of GDP between 2000 and 2050. The present value of
deficits  is  51%  of GDP, equivalent  to an  annuity  of 1.7%  of GDP throughout  the
projection period. Actual deficits currently incurred  by public pension systems  add to
these deficits  as the study assumes initially balanced pension finances.  In addition, the
AWG  results  are  based  on  optimistic  assumptions  regarding  labour  market
projections  as  well  as  developments  outside  public  pensions  for  private  sector
employees.  Assuming  unchanged  labour market  variables  and  a real  mterest rate  of
3%  yields a total burden of close to 90% of GDP. Labour market and the interest rate
assumptions contribute about equally to this increase.
A partial reform  approach  is found incapable  of solving the ageing problem  despite
favourable  macroeconomic  assumptions.  The  reform balances  the pension  systems
over the  projection  period by lowering benefits,  raising  the  effective  retirement  age
and increasing the  contribution  rates.  However,  further rises m contributLon  rates are
incompatible  with  the necessary  rise  in employment  rates to  balance  the  system.  In
addition,  even if the  optimistic  labour  market projections  matenalise  in the reform
scenario, the pay-as-you-go  systems run an aggregate deficit of close to 21/2%  of GDP
at  the  end  of  the  projection  period.  The  aggregate  present  value  of  this  deficit
through 2100 exceeds  20% of 2002  GDP. While the  above results refer to a specific
reform  scenario,  the  overall  message  from  altemative  scenarios  would  remnain
basically  unchanged  due  to  the  fundamental  problems  of pay-as-you-go  systems
facing adverse demographic  developments.  /
A  comprehensive  reform,  including  a  move  towards  partial  funding,  is  found  to
achieve  permanent  financial  viability  of  the  public  pension  system  and  induce
necessary employment growth.  Shifting part of the pay-as-you-go contributions into a
funded pillar  and reducing replacement  rates makes  the  pay-as-you-go  systems  fully
sustainable. New pensioners offset the reductions  in pay-as-you-go pensions  through
benefits from the  funded pillar, but total replacement rates remain  below those in the
partial  reform  case until  2040.  The  distribution  of this  reform  burden is  a political
question.  In  addition  to leaving  it on  new pensioners  as  in  the reform  scenario,  it
could  be  imposed  on  current  pensioners  through  lower  indexation,  on  future
generations  through  raising  public  debt,  or on any  combmation  of these  groups.  It
should be  noted,  however,  that  also  the  benefits  of a  move  to  partial  funding  are
uncertain  and  fiscal  prudence  remains  indispensable.  Uncertainties  include,  for
example,  demographic forecasts  as well as projected  asset returns.
25The  results  carry  broader  economic  policy  implications.  First,  the  ageing-induced
burdens  call  for rapid measures  to strengthen  fiscal  sustainabihity.  An  optimal set of
raeasures  would  most  likely  not  be  restricted  to pension  reform  measures  and  its
clesign  requires  further  discussion.  Second,  a  widespread  strengthenng  of  funded
pension  arrangements  changes  the  structure  of nsks  bome  by  the  pension  system
participants and requires  adapting the regulatory  and monitoring framework.  Finally,
the accumulation of large pension  funds can affect the euro area's external balance as
well  as  the operation  of capital  markets  and  the  transmission  of monetary  policy.
Vhile  these  last  effects  are  likely  to  occur  only  gradually,  prudence  mandates
continuous monitonng of the developments.
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27A.  Appendix  I: Alternative scenarios
Assumptions
Four  alternative  scenarios  were  modelled  to  assess  the  sensitivity  of the  baseline
scenario results (see chapter 4)  to changes in macroeconomic  or policy variables. The
scenarios  capture  the effects  of changes  in  the retirement  age, migration  behaviour,
productivity  growth  and  the  interest  rate.  In  particular,  relative  to  the  baseline
scenario, in:
scenario  1  retirement age is increased by 1 year by 2010, remaming at the increased
level thereafter,
scenario 2  net migration is increased by 100% throughout the projection  period,
scenario 3  productivity growth is increased by 0.5 percentage points throughout the
projection period,
scenario 4  the real interest rate is set to 3% throughout the projection period.
The  scenarios  are  simulated  for the  four  largest  euro  area  countries.  In particular,
scenarios  2  to  4  are  modelled  for  Germany,  France,  Italy  and  Spain.  Scenario  1
excludes  Italy,  because  its reformed  notional  defined  contribution  system  does not
allow  for  changes  in  the  retirement  age  without  actuarially  fair  increases  in  the
replacement ratio, depriving such a reform of its major budgetary impact.  The starting
year for reforms is 2000.
Scenario 1 (retirement  age)
With  an  increase  in  the  retiremnent  age,  pension  expenditure  in  the  three  large
countries  will  grow  from  a  current  8.5%  of GDP  to  13.3%  of GDP  by 2050  as
compared  to  13.7%  in  the  respective  baseline  scenano  (table  Al). 14 Similarly,  the
current balance  improves  relative  to  the baseline  scenario,  but it remains  clearly  in
deficit. The  balance  is  projected  to  fall  to a  maximum  deficit of 5.1%  of GDP  by
2050  compared  with  5.4%  in  the  baseline  scenario.  This  deficit  corresponds  to  a
present value of 33.9% of GDP,  equivalent  to an annuity  of 1.0%, which compares
with  46.1%  and  1.5%,  respectively,  reflecting  the strong  cumulation  effect  over  the
projection  period.  The  effect  of later  retirement  varies  across  countries.  While  in
France  a  decrease  in  pension  expenditure  of 0.3  percentage  points  of  GDP  is
observed, 0.7 percentage points are found in Spain.
Table Al  Early retirement scenario v. baseline  scenario (e-3)
baseline  scenario  retirement scenario
2000  2050  absolute  2050  absolute
change  change
(ppt of GDP)  (ppt of GDP)
Ciirrent balance (%  of GDP)  0 0  -5.4  -54  -5.1  -52
Pension expenditure (%  of GDP)  8.5  13 7  5 1  13.3  4.7
Dep ndcncyratso  24 1  49 3  6 7  49 3  6.7
_.EpDloyment  ratio-  1.6  1.5  -0 7  14  -0.8
Average pension / GDP per employed  17.5  154  I 1  154  - 1
Ehgibility ratio  13  1.2  -0 2  1.2  -0  3
Residual  0.5  0.3
The increase in the retirement  age  affects  the pension system  through an increase  in
emplovment  and  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  pensioners.  Age  specific
14  '[hiS is  less than McMorrow  and  Roeger's  (2002)  estimated  reduction of pension expenditure of 0.8
percentage  pomnts  of GDP per  year  of additional work  One  explanation  may  be that the  present
study  already  takes  planned  increases  in  the effecttve  retirement ages  and  reductLons  in  pension
generosity  into account, making additional reforms  less effective
28unemployment  rates  are  assumed  unchanged  and  all  additional  employees  are
assumed  to  contribute  to  the pension  system.  To  isolate  the  effect of the changing
contribution-pensioner  ratio,  average  replacement  ratios  have  been  set  unchanged
relative  to the baseline  scenario. Looking  at the decomposition,  employment is going
up and  the  eligibility  ratio  is  going down, while the  dependency  ratio is  unaffected.
The effects  add up to the joint reduction of expenditure by 0.4%  percentage points of
GDP compared  to the baselne scenario.  The dependency  ratio, however,  remains as
the drivmg force behind the rising expenditure over time.
Scenario 2 (migration)
The  doubling of net  migration  across  all  age  cohorts  brings  the  total  number  of
immigrants  to  848,000  in  2000. Due  to  the downward  trend in  Germany,  which  is
only  partially  offset  by  the  developments  in  Spain  and  Italy,  projected  net
inmmigration  is 766,000 in 2050.  It amounts  to 0.36% of the total population in 2000
and decreases  to 0.31% in 2050. Over the projection period,  the total number of net
immigrants  to the  euro area  adds up to approximately  16.5%  of the total population
in  2000.  The  age  structure  of  the  migrants  is  based  on  the  simplistic  base  line
projections by Eurostat.
This scenario has strong beneficial effects on the pension system in the four countries
as  can be seen in  table A2.  Expenditure will  rise by only 3.4% of GDP  to 11.6%  as
compared to 12.7% of GDP in the respective baseline scenario. In hine with aggregate
expenditure  the  current balance  improves  to a deficit of 3.8%  of GDP by 2050, the
present  value  of which  amounts  to  33.2%  of GDP.  A negative  annual  annuity  of
1.0%  over the projection  horizon  is equivalent  to this present value.  In comparison,
the  respective  baseline  scenario  results  were  45.0%  as  the  present  value  of the
system's deficits and a 1.5% annuity.
Table A2  Migration scenario v.  baseline  scenario (e-4)
baseline scenario  nugratmon scenario
2000  2050  absolute  2050  absolute
change  change
(%  of GDP)  (%  of GDP
Current balance (%  of GDP)  0 0  4 8  -4 8  -3  8  -3 8
Pension  expenditure (%  of  GDP)  81  127  4 6  11 6  3 4
Dependency ratio  24 7  517  6 6  469  57
Employmentratio  16  15  -0 9  1 5  -10
Average pension / GDP per employed  16 7  144  -1 2  144  -12
Eligibility ratio  12  12  -02  12  -0.1
Residual  0.3  0 1
The increase in migration affects pension  systems through the lmproved age structure
of the population.  For  ease  of comparison,  migrants  are  assumed  to have  the same
labour  market  characteristics  as  the  domestic  population  and  average  replacement
rates have been assumed unchanged  from the baseline  scenario as in scenario  1. The
dependency  ratio is projected  to  rise  by  less  than  in  the baseline  scenario,  namely
from 24.7% to 46.9%  as compared  to 51.7% in the baseline  scenario. The change  of
the dependency  ratio is only 2.4 percentage  points in France,  while it accounts  for 5
to 6 percentage  points for the other countries.
As  shown in chart Al  total population  increases  to  a peak of 254  million (in  2032)
instead of 242 million  (in 2015)  as  compared with  the baseline scenario, and declines
less  strongly  to  246  million  in  2050  as  compared  with  222  milion  in  the  baseline
scenario.
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Scenarno 3 (productiwiiy)
Based  on  a  productivity  growth  rate,  which  is  0.5  percentage  points  higher
txroughout  the projection  period than  in the  baseline  scenario, pension  expenditure
in  the  four countries  is  projected  to increase  by 3.7  percentage  points  to  11.8%  of
GDP by 2050 (table A3). This is 0.9 percentage  points of GDP below the respective
baseline scenario result.  In line with  this lower increase in expenditure,  the balance is
projected  to improve  over time, i.e.  to develop  less negatively  to a deficit of 4.2% of
GDP  by  2050  as  compared  to  4.8%  of GDP  In  the  baseline  scenario.  Over  the
projection  penod,  the pension  system is  expected to generate  deficits with a present
value of 44.0% of GDP, which is equivalent  to a  constant negative annuity of 1.3%.
The  relatively  small  difference  compared  with  the  baseline  scenario  results  (45.0%
arid  1.5%, respectively)  is  explained  by the change in the  discount  factor with higher
productivity and therefore higher output growth rates. On the country level, there are
again  significant  differences.  Increased productivity  causes  the strongest  expenditure
effect  in  Spain  with  a  cut of  1.4 percentage  points,  while  in  Germany  this  effect
accounts  only for a reduction of 0.4 percentage points.
Table A3  Productivity scenario v. baseline scenario (e-4)
baseline scewrio  productivity scenario
2000  2050  absolute  2050  absolute
change  change
(%  of GDP)  L  (%  of GDP)
C anrent balance (%of GDP)  0 0  -4 8  -48  -42  -42
Pension expenditure (%  of GDP)  - 8.1  12 7  4 6  118  3 7
Dendenc  yratio  24.7  517  6 6  517  6 6
Emnployrnent ratio'  165  1 46  -0 9  1  46  -0 9
Average pension / GDP per  employed  16 7  144  -1.2  13 4  -17
Eligibility  ratio  120  117  -0 2  117  -02
Residual  0.3  0 0
The  change  in  the  productivity  growth  assumption  affects  the  pension  system
through  higher GDP growth,  higher wages  and  social  security  contributions, and-
depending  on  the  indexation  rules-the  relative  increase  of existing  pensions.  The
benefit ratio, expressed as  average pension per GDP per employed,  is assumed to fall
more  clearly  from a  current  16.7%  to  13.4%  by 2050  as  compared to  14.4%  in  the
baseline  scenario,  reflecting  the  dominance  of inflation  indexed  pension  systems in
the  sample  countries.  The  remaining  variables  are  not  affected  by  a  change  in
productivity.
30Scenario 4 (interest rate)
A lower  real interest rate  of 3%  throughout  the projection  period affects the present
value  of the  pension  system's  deficit  through its impact  on  the  discount  factor, but
none of the other  factors  that were  shown in the tables  above.  Under  this scenano,
the pension  system is expected  to generate deficits  with a present value  of 64.6%  of
GDP, compared with  the  baseline  scenario  result of 45.0%  of GDP  The impact  of
the interest  rate  assumption  on the  annuity is  smaller  as it only works  through  the
distribution of payments  over time. The lower interest rate yields an  annuity of 1.7%
of GDP, compared with 1.5%  in the baseline scenario.
B.  Appendlx II: Major variables
Table B1  Major variables (baseline  scenario,E-9)  (1)
2000  2050
Population  281,736,000  266,763,000
Net migration  507.823  470.000
Old age dependency ratio  24 3  50 2
Average  life expectancy  men  75 1  80 1
Average  life expectancy  women  81 8  85 8
Fertility rate  14  1 6
Real GDP growth (in percent)  2 6  14
Productivity growth (in percent)  1  8  1 8
Real interest rate (in percent)  4 0  4 0
Inflation (in percent)  1 8  1 7
Employment ratio (in  percent)  61  0  68 0
Unemployment  rate (m percent)  9 9  6 2
Aggregate replacement  rate (all  pensions)  16  5  14 2
Average retirement age (old  age pensions)  62 0  63 0
1)  Vartables as defined m the text
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